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The Protection of Refugees and Internally
Displaced Persons: Non-Refoulement under
Customary International Law?
PHIL C.W. CHAN
Visiting Fellow, Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge
ABSTRACT After decades of inter- and intra-State wars, the United Nations named 20 June 2004 as
World Refugee Day with ‘A Place to Call Home’ as its theme. However, whilst citizens in war-free
countries were able to commemorate this significant day in the safety of their homes, for millions of
refugees and internally displaced persons who yearn for safety and security, a home is but a distant
hope. In the light of the plight of these unfortunate persons, this article will examine whether a
state is under a duty, under customary international law and independent of the 1951
Refugees Convention and the 1967 Refugees Protocol, to offer a home – asylum – to refugees
and internally displaced persons.
‘Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.’1
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art.14(1)
‘Internal displacement is a global crisis that affects from 20 to 25 million people in
over 40 countries, in literally all regions of the world.’2
Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons
Introduction
After decades of inter- and intra-State wars, the United Nations named 20 June 2004 as
World Refugee Day with ‘A Place to Call Home’ as its theme. However, whilst citizens
in war-free countries were able to commemorate this significant day in the safety of their
homes, for millions of refugees and internally displaced persons who yearn for safety and
security, a home is but a distant hope.
In the light of the plight of these unfortunate persons, this article will examine whether a
state is under a duty under international law to offer a home – asylum – to refugees and
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internally displaced persons. It should be noted that to create rule of customary inter-
national law, two requirements must be satisfied, namely State practice, which must be
‘both extensive and virtually uniform . . . and should moreover have occurred in such a
way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved’,3
to be accompanied by opinio juris, namely an intention on the part of the relevant States
tending to such recognition ‘to distinguish legal obligations from non-legal obligations,
such as obligations derived from considerations of morality, courtesy or comity’.4
Whilst ‘both [the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UCHCR)] and the
[United Nations] General Assembly went even further in assessing that, in many instances,
the internally displaced are present alongside refugees . . . in situations where it is neither
reasonable nor feasible to treat the categories differently in responding to their needs for
assistance and protection’,5 the two groups will be discussed separately for contrast and
clarity.
Refugees
The 1951 Refugees Convention and the Principle of Non-Refoulement
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees6 (Refugees Convention) is the
cornerstone of any analysis of international refugee law and asylum will be granted
only to a refugee so defined in accordance therewith. Under Article 1A(2) of the Refugees
Convention, as amended by Article 1(2) of the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees7 (Refugees Protocol), a refugee is one who,
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.8
The Refugees Convention being a multilateral treaty, the crucial issue to the purpose of
this article is whether the principle of non-refoulement, as enshrined in Article 33
thereof and upon which the whole thrust of international refugees law rests, is binding
upon non-party States as a rule of customary international law. It provides that ‘[N]o Con-
tracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.’9
State Practice
Generality of Practice. As of 1 February 2004, 145 states are parties to either the
Refugees Convention or the Refugees Protocol, or both. This significant number demon-
strates a general consensus within the international community that the principle of non-
refoulement in Article 33 has acquired the status of a rule of customary international law as
it is widely recognised that ‘the multilateral treaty-making process is legislative in
objective but contractual in method’.10 Moreover, Article 33 is a provision to which































reservations cannot be made; under Article 42(1) of the Refugees Convention, ‘any State
may make reservations to Articles of the Convention other than Articles 1, 3, 4, 16(1), 33,
36–46 inclusive’.11 The Refugees Protocol also contains a similar limitation.12 Robinson
elucidates that:
Following the example of the 1933 and 1938 Conventions and the recent United
Nations practice, Article 42 divides the articles of the Convention into such parts
to which reservations by States are permissible and such which have to be accepted
as they stand or no adherence to the Convention may take place at all. This is the
result of the contention that several of the provisions are so fundamental that, if
they are not accepted by a state, the Convention could not fulfil its purpose.13
Consistency of Practice. The principle of non-refoulement has further been broadened
by a significant number of other important multilateral treaties as well as United
Nations declarations and resolutions. For instance, the 1967 Declaration on Territorial
Asylum, unanimously adopted by the General Assembly,14 states that ‘[n]o one [entitled
to asylum] shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier or, if he has
already entered the territory in which he seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return
to any State where he may be subjected to persecution’.15 Similarly, the fourth Geneva
Convention on the Law of War16 provides that ‘[p]rotected persons shall not be transferred
to a Power which is not a party to the Convention . . . In no circumstances shall a protected
person be transferred to a country where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for
his or her political opinions or religious beliefs’.17
At the regional level, regard is had to the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees,18
which Kourula observes as ‘[reiterating the principle of non-refoulement’s] importance
and meaning, including the prohibition of rejection at the frontiers, as a corner-stone of
the international protection of refugees, and [noting] that the principle is imperative in
regard to refugees and should be acknowledged and observed as a rule of jus cogens’.19
It is paramount that this Declaration is now most authoritative on this matter among
Central American countries.20 In addition, the 1969 Organisation of African Unity Con-
vention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa21 proclaims that
‘[n]o person shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expul-
sion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical
integrity or liberty would be threatened’.22 As to Asia, the 1966 Principles Concerning
Treatment of Refugees23 propounded by the Asian–African Legal Consultative Commit-
tee observe too the international consensus surrounding the principle of non-refoutement
by providing an analogous provision.24 Regarding Europe, where the two World Wars ori-
ginated, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention)25 obtains and will now be looked into by reference to
Article 3 thereof (which concerns torture) since ‘[p]rotection against refoulement is . . .
closely related to protection against torture and inhuman or degrading treatment’,26 to
examine whether the principle of non-refoulement has emerged as a rule of customary
international law. The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment27 (Torture Convention) and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights28 (ICCPR) will also be discussed as a
matter of course.































Relevancy of Prohibition Against Torture. In this analysis, the European Convention
should be preferred to both the Torture Convention29 and the ICCPR as the respective
responsible supervisory organs for the latter two treaties, namely the Convention
against Torture Committee and the Human Rights Committee, do not possess legal auth-
ority to enforce their views which thus only have moral force upon the States Parties
thereto, whilst judgments of the European Court of Human Rights have legally binding
effects upon the 45 Members States of the Council of Europe and their implementation
is supervised by the Committee of Ministers.30 It is worth noting, nevertheless, that
State practice (which is essential to creating a rule of customary international law) demon-
strates consistent compliance with the Views of the Convention against Torture Commi-
ttee31 and that ‘a Special Rapporteur was appointed, in 1990, and a procedure created to
follow up the views of the Human Rights Committee’.32
Article 3 of the European Convention provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.33 This prohibition is absolute in
nature, as indicated by the European Court of Human Rights in Ireland v. United
Kingdom 34 that ‘the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim’s conduct’;35 and in Soering
v. United Kingdom 36 that ‘Article 3 makes no provision for exception and no derogation
from it is permissible under Article 15 in time of war or other national emergency’.37
The relevancy of this provision vis-a`-vis the principle of non-refoulement lies with the
precept that State responsibility will be incurred on the part of the State from which
asylum is requested but which nevertheless denies asylum in violation of non-refoulement
‘where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if
extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment in his or her home country’.38 Lambert argues that ‘by reaching far
beyond the limits of its own decisions and jurisdiction, the work of the Strasbourg
organs on non-refoulement is of a norm-creating character’.39
Concluding Remarks on State Practice. The general consensus on the importance of
the principle of non-refoulement at both global and regional levels, the enormity both
qualitatively and quantitatively of resolutions and declarations in support of non-
refoulement, and the absolute prohibition against torture as a rule of jus cogens confirm
that non-refoulement has acquired status as a rule of customary international law by
virtue of the relevant State practice, which is itself extensive and uniform.
Opinio Juris
Unless judicial activity is to result in reducing the legal significance of the most
potent source of rules of international law, namely the conduct of States, it would
appear that the accurate principle on the subject consists in regarding all uniform
conduct of Governments (or, in appropriate cases, abstention therefrom) as
evidencing the opinio necessitates juris except when it is shown that the conduct
in question was not accompanied by any such intention.40
This authoritative statement by the late Hersch Lauterpacht discerns that opinio juris does
not necessarily have to be proved separately but can be derived from evidence of State
practice itself. Grahl-Madsen observes in relation to the 1954 United Nations Conference































on the Status of Stateless Persons that the principle of non-refoulement is ‘an expression of
a generally accepted principle’.41 Moreover, there is general consensus amongst legal
scholars42 that non-refoulement has now ‘become binding as a matter of both treaty and
customary law if not also as a so-called peremptory norm or jus cogens’.43 Whilst Hail-
bronner differs by doubting the existence of extensive and more or less uniform State prac-
tice accompanied by opinio juris;44 and in discounting as ‘wishful legal thinking’45 the
contention that non-refoulement has become a rule of customary international law, he is
criticised for ‘[overlooking] the consensus at the global, regional and national levels in
favour of addressing in some way the claims of those persons in one’s territory or at
one’s borders who fear harm in their country of origin as a result of serious disturbances
of public order’.46 Thus, in the light of the importance of the principle of non-refoulement,
the significant number of States Parties to the Refugees Convention and the Refugees
Protocol, the consistency of observance of non-refoulement even outside the Refugees
Convention regime at both global and national levels, the close correlation between
refoulement and torture, and, above all, ‘elementary considerations of humanity’,47 the
necessary opinio juris should be found as sufficiently exemplified by reference to such
State practice as evidenced above.
Internally Displaced Persons
In accordance with the UNHCR’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,
internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced
or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular
as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of genera-
lised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and
who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border.48
Given that no international treaty concerns itself with internally displaced persons,49 it
cannot but be true that a State is under no duty under customary international law to
grant asylum to these persons despite their severe plight. Although it is the UNHCR
which determines who is within its mandate,50 ‘[t]he activities of the UNHCR . . . must
not be confused with state practice’.51 Asylum simply cannot be granted to any internally
displaced persons given the pre-eminence in international law of the principles of territorial
sovereignty and non-intervention.52 As the International Court of Justice reaffirmed in
Nicaragua v. United States,
The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to
conduct its affairs without outside interference . . . the Court considers that it is
part and parcel of customary international law. As the Court has observed:
‘Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foun-
dation of international relations’ (ICJ Reports 1949, p.35), and international law
requires political integrity also to be respected. . . . The existence in the opinio
juris of States of the principle of non-intervention is backed by established and
substantial practice. It has moreover been presented as a corollary of the principle
of the sovereign equality of States.53































Notwithstanding and without prejudice to the desirability of a legal regime covering intern-
ally displaced persons,54 the question of whether a State is under a duty under customary
international law to grant asylum to these persons must thus be answered in the negative.
Concluding Remarks
Australia on 13 July 2004 announced that holders of an Australian temporary protection
visa were to be allowed to apply within Australia – and thus without first returning to
their home countries from which they fled in the first place – for ordinary migration
visas that would allow for permanent settlement. Whilst this move was laudable, it was
but one step towards successful amelioration of the world refugees problem and the inter-
national community must continue to observe both in letter and in spirit the principle of
non-refoulement. As Ambassador Moore, United States Co-ordinator for Refugee
Affairs, stated in 1987, ‘[c]onsidering that the most important element of a refugee’s pro-
tection was the obligation of non-refoulement . . . [t]he threat to a country posed by influ-
xes of economic migrants should not serve as an excuse for refusing asylum’.55 This
analysis, it is hoped, has illustrated that the principle of non-refoulement has transformed
itself from a treaty provision into a rule of customary international law, if not one of jus
cogens. As Grahl-Madsen asserts: ‘We may, indeed, consider it a principle of civilisation,
one of the building blocks of civilised government.’56 Meanwhile, the alarming phenom-
enon of internal displacement must be borne in mind and resolved. Whilst ‘[n]ational auth-
orities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian
assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction’,57 it is common
ground that the problem will diminish significantly if full observance of international
humanitarian law – especially with respect to civilians – is attained.58
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